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NEW NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM
S. PRAKASH SINHA*
INTRODUCTION

New states have emerged in Asia and Africa as part of the existing
international system. They inject new interests, new conditions, and a
new structure of social relations in this system. From their perspectives
of the nature of law governing this system, they seek formulation of certain new rules of international law. Some of these are hoped to supersede certain traditional rules, and others to add to the existing ones.
When the means for achieving this adjustment are searched, treaty is
often believed to provide the answer. However, treaty binds only the
parties to it and does not create general rules of international law.
Moreover, treaty is possible only between the willing states. But the
problem of achieving that adjustment of international law which is desired by the new states is limited neither to a small number of willing
states nor with respect to a particular transaction. It is larger than
treaty. While the useful role of treaty in achieving a limited, but nevertheless important, adjustment of law must not be underrated, it need
be realized that a deletion or addition in the existing body of general
international law cannot be achieved by treaty.' Consequently, resort
must be had to international custom. Therefore, this article proposes to
examine the significance of custom making in international law for the
newly independent states of Asia and Africa.
PLACE OF CUSTOM IN THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is a product of the practice of states during the past
four centuries. It is customary. It came to be so as a consequence of a
process of evolution and refinement. This law was known as the law
of nations until Jeremy Benthan called it "international" in 1789,2 and
*B. Com., LL.B., C.W.A, MS., LL.M., J.S.D., Associate Professor of Law, The University of South Dakota School of Law.

1. It is sometimes suggested that a multilateral treaty or convention would achieve
this wider purpose. However, the concluding of the multilateral treaty has certain
limitations, discussed later in this article, which make it hardly more expedient than

the formulation of custom for establishing a new rule of international law.
2. The term international law first appeared in Jeremy Bentham's introduction to
his book, AN INTRODUcTION To ThE PRINCIPLES oF MoRAs AND LEGisLOAs.N (1789).
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it originated in the jus gentium of the classical period of Roman law.
Jus civile governed the Romans and jus gentium referred to the special
status granted to foreigners in Rome. This, in the western world, ap3
pears to be the first instance of a legal relationship with foreigners.
A triple distinction of law is made in the Justinian compilation where
the civil law, the law of nations, and the law of nature compose the
scheme of law. The medieval Christian theologians seem to have later
adopted this 'distinction in constructing their own ecclesiastical, or
canon, law. Unlike the Roman law, the law of nature of these theologians postulated the existence of a higher authority than man and his
legal systems.4 The law of nations was considered as man-made law
of superhuman origin." Partly, at least, it grew from the positive law of
human legislators, a fact which was first pointed out by Abelard and
the French scholars of canon law in the twelfth century. The juristic
thought of the later middle ages, notably at the beginning of the fourteenth century, viewed the law of nature as common to all peoples; it
applied certain principles of the law of nations in both domestic affairs
as well as in relations with other peoples; 6 and it distinguished the civil
law from both the law of nature and the law of nations.
Until the twelfth century, the view prevailed in the western world
that the Roman custom, the consuetudo communis, applied throughout the known world. The emperors of the west were regarded by the
'medieval lawyer as law-givers not only for the occident but for the
entire world, for the universus orbis.7 From the twelfth century onward, the Imperial power began to abate as the universal law-giver.
3. Cf. P. Guggenheim, The Birth of Autonomous International Law, in C. W. JENKS,
et al., INTERNATIONAL LAw IN A CHANGING WORLD, 80 (1963).
4. Thus, St. Augustine maintained in the fourth century that law eternal, or the law
of nature, took precedence over temporal and secular law. St. Isidore, the Bishop of
Seville in the sixth century, wrote in the fifth book of his EryMoLooIEs that the origin
of the law of nature rested in the natural instincts of man and not in any human legislative system.
5. This was the contention of certain medieval writers, such as St. Isidore in the
sixth century, Gratian's decree published about 1140, St. Thomas Aquinas, and various
other writers of the late thirteenth century.
6. These rules were applied in relation to all other peoples, Christian or non-Christian. Three centuries later, Grotius elaborated the notion into a concept that the application of the law of nations was not limited to Christendom alone. H. Grotius, Mare
Liberwy (1609) in THE CLrssics oF INTIRNATioNAL LAW 11 (R. van Deman Magofin
transl. 1916).
7. Contemporary practice supports this notion. For example, King Robert of Sicily
invoked pandects and codex no less than twenty times in his instructions to his legates
to the Pope in 1319. See P. Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 84.
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Rulers claimed exemption from the Emperor's authority -on legal
grounds, such as prescription, privilege granted by the Emperor, ancient custom, and even assumption of irregular titles. Eventually, the
Holy Roman Empire broke up, giving the final truth to the popular
saying that it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. It was in the
spirit of these times that Bartole wrote that "civitates non recognoscunt
superiorum [states do not recognize a higher authority than their
own]," and Balde stated that "Rex in regno suo est imperator regni
[the king, in his kingdom, is emperor of that kingdom]." 8 With the
fall of the Roman Empire a feudal system of authority emerged in
Europe. There grew a world of warrior, priest, free farmer, serf, and
the local trader. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the
western man had colonized the new world and moved eastward in
quest of further trade. He also searched for a new ordering of the
system of authority to control the rich life of this trade and intercourse. He found it not in a Roman state but in the nation-state. At
first the warrior chief became the sovereign; but soon an impersonal
sovereign emerged to take his place. It was the modem state. The state
was sovereign. It was impersonal. It was separate from its prince, separate even from its government. It was a juridical entity by itself.' The
final step in the emergence of the modern system of states is represented
by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years'
War. 0 From the viewpoint of that system, the world was carved into
various states." The new states took shape along the Aristotelian concept of the civitas perfecta, that the state was self-sufficing. The civil
law and the law of nature provided them their legal foundation. The
law of nations provided them the governing principle for the juridical
relations among themselves. It thus faded out of civil law and emerged
as a law applicable exclusively to the inter-state relations. It was newly
conceived. Its content now needed to be developed.
Vitoria (1480-1546) had advanced in 1557 the new concept of the
community of nations, the societas gentium, which obeyed one law,
8. Id.
9. K.

S. CARLSTON, LAW AND STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL

ACTION, 132-133 (1956).

10. L. Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. IN'L L. 20 (1948).

11. As Professor Carlston has stated, although the structure of the world was so
compartmentalized, neither the social action of the world could be so compartmentalized
nor was one state able to achieve authority over all social action. The system thus failed
to provide the necessary means of control for the social action of the world society even
under the conditions of the world of 1648. CARLSTO-N, supra Note 9.

NEW NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM

the jus ge7rtium.12 This law was either equated with or derived from
the law of nature. In 1612, Suarez (1548-1617) viewed the law of
nations as independent of the law of nature in certain respects.' 3 In
1625, Grotius (1583-1645) distinguished it completely from the law of
nature and asserted its fully autonomous status, although he does not
seem quite clear as to what rules belong to which laws. 14 Later, particularly in the eighteenth century, the law of nations was claimed to
prevail over the law of nature. Jurists, such as Christian Wolff (16791754) of Germany 5 and Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767) of Switzerland, "' stripped the law of nature of its legal imperative and confined
it to its moral influence, and Otto von Gierke (1841-1921) of Germany
held that the role of the law of nations was independent of the civil law
and the law of nature. 1 7 Finally, the legal historians of the nineteenth
century expounded that a legal system is valid to the extent of its effectiveness. That gave birth to the contemporary theory of positive law.
International law is valid if it conforms to the actual practice of states.
Thus, when the first foundations of the newly conceived law of
nations were being laid it was generally accepted that nature had given
man universally' valid inherent rights, which could be discovered
through right reason. This law which nature gave man was a higher
law to which all mankind was subject. At first it was thought that this
higher law rested directly upon the conscience of rulers as individuals
and thence upon states. Later, when the state itself was given juridical
personality, the law of nations became that branch of the law of nature
which applied to the society of states. This conception of the law of
nations had profound influence on it in its early formative stages in the
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. But since it was impossible
to found an objective legal system upon so subjective a basis as a
12.

F. DE VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IyRE BELLI RELECTIONES (1557) (ed. E. Nys 1917).
13. F. Suarez, De legibus, ac Deo Legislatore, (1612), Ch. XIX, § 1, 2 in CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1944).
14. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Tres (1625), Prolegomena (corresponding to
§5 40 and 41 of the translation by F.W. Kelsey), Ch. I, § XIV, (CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1913).

15. C. WOLFF, INsTrrunoNEs JURIS NATuRAE ET GENTIUM, IN QUIBUS Ex IPSA Hommixus
NATURA CONTINUO NEXU ONES OBLIGATINON
ET JuRA OmNIA DEDUCUNTUR, Ch. 11, 12
ff. (1769).
16. E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens; ou, Principes de la Ioi naturelle appliquis h]a
conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains, (1758), Preliminaires, §§ 26, 27,
in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

17. O.F.

voNq

RECHTSTHEORIEN,

(1916).

GIERKE, DIE GRUNDBEGRIFFE DES STAATSRECHTS UND DIE NEUFSTEN STAATSUNVERANDERTER

sAATSwISENSmcHAFT,

(1915).
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revealed law of nature, it gave way in the nineteenth century to the
positivist approach, according to which what is law and what should
be law are not necessarily the same thing. What the international law
is can be discovered only by an examination of the practice of states
and the principles upon which this practice is based. The validity of
this law is sought in the common consent of states. Substantial uniformity of practice becomes evidence of the existence of the convergence of the wills of the states, which produces a rule that binds a state
without reference to its particular consent. Scientific methodology has
been used to develop the content of the principles of international law
along these lines. International law is created by a general recognition
among states of a certain practice as obligatory. It is customary. Its
existing rules are a product of international custom. Originating in
common consent of states, they bind all states without requiring the
particular consent of any state. Treaty creates binding rules too,
but whether bilateral or multilateral, it does not bind states not party
to it. It is custom which creates rules of general application. Treaties
provisions are
may facilitate creation of customary law when same
S4
adopted with respect to a particular matter by different sets of states
in a regular succession. Such a treaty pattern may generate a general
norm. But it acquires its authority of general international law not from
the treaties themselves, but from the practice of states which the treaties
prompted and evidenced. 8 Thus, in the final analysis, custom is of natal
significance to international law.
THE NEW STATES AND THE EXISTING INTERNATONAL LAw

As seen above, the existing body of international law is a product
of international custom, established almost entirely during a period
when the newly independent states of Asia and Africa were excluded
from its formative process,1" for they were not states then. During
that period the economic conditions, the structure of social relations,
and the interests for which the rules of international law were developed
were different from, and at times conflicting with, those of the new
states of Asia and Africa. Consequently, upon emergence as states, they
criticize or reject certain of the existing rules which tend to prejudice
their interests, although they have neither denied the very system of
international law nor rejected its rules entirely. They have also shown
18. H. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, Acad~mie de droit
international de la Haye, 106 RECUMAL DES COURS 1, 40-41 (1962).
19. Recent rules as to the continental shelf are an exception.
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interest in the development of such new rules as would help promote
their interestsY In addition, they are interested in the growth of what
may. be called an emerging law of world society which, as distinguished
from the traditional international law composed of binding rules governing inter-state relations, includes
all those rules which are not purely domestic law but nevertheless possess a legal quality and purport to control the action of the
participants in international society, including states, international
21
organizations, public and private corporations, and individuals.
The emergence of this law has been generated by the increasing volume
as well as the varied facets of international action in recent years, which
are increasingly transforming the international society into a world
society.2 The new states desire a development of this law. For example,
the economic needs of these states have created a phenomenon of international economic development, as distinguished from the traditional
international economic ventures, 23 which has given rise to the need for
a body of rules and principles to govern the legal aspects of this phenomenon. Neither classic international law nor national laws are adequate to meet this need entirely. 24 Consequently, the institutions and
20. The attitudes of these states toward rules of international law, the conditioning
factors for their attitudes, and the significance of these attitudes for international law
have been analyzed in detail in S.P. SInHA, NEw NATONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS,
(1967).

21. Carlston, Book Review, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 472, 473 (1965). Cf. Ross' intern statsfoellesskabsret (A. Ross, Laereoog i Folkeret, 4. udg., 32 (1961)), and Verdross' interne
Staatsoemeinscbaftsrecht (A. Verdross, Rdgles gdndrale du droit internationalde la paix,
Acad~mie de droit international de la Haye, 30 RECUEIL DES CouRs 275, 311 (1929)).

22. An exploration of this phenomenon is found in W. FIED.NiANN, THE
SmucruRE OF INTERNATIONAL

CHANGING

LAW, (1964).

23. The concept of economic "development" involves non-economic factors of an
economic process. It has a political motivation. It describes the powers of social and
cultural change which produces results that cannot be measured in economic terms.
J.N. Hyde, Economic Development Agreements, Acad6mie de droit international de

]a

Haye, 105

RECUEIL DES

EMERGmG CouN-Rnus,

COURs 271, 273-274 (1962); RE. AsHF.R,

DEvELOPMENT OF THE

Ch. 2 (1962).

24. The phenomenon has presented tvo categories of legal situations; one involving
inter-state relations where international law applies, the other which are nor governed
by public international law, as in the case of those agreements of economic development where one of the contracting parties is a private party and the other is a developing state. Since, in the latter situation, public international law does not apply directly,
the problem would ordinarily be one of choice of law and the rules of private international law, or conflicts law, would suggest the territorial law of one state or the other to
apply in a particular situation. However, many of the developing countries are governed
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practices of international economic development are creating an international law of economic cooperation 25 which, as distinguished from
the traditional international law, forms part of the emerging law of
world society. 6 The new states are interested in its growth.
As to the existing body of international law, which is the matter of
our primary concern here, the new states desire an adjustment to
achieve, first, the deletion from it of those rules which tend to prejudice
their interests, and, second, the addition to it of such rules as would
help promote and realize their own interests.
EFFEc T OF AN ATTITUDE OF DISAPPROVAL UPON A CUSTOMARY NoR I

Of relevance, then, is the question that what is the effect of a state's
attitude of disapproval of an existing rule of international law. As seen
above, rules of international law which have general application are
established by international custom, and once thus established they are
binding upon a state without reference to its particular consent. Accordingly, an existing rule of international law is neither lapsed nor
diminished by a state's disapproval of it. It prevails until a countervailing practice of states is established. Furthermore, when a new state
emerges it is deemed bound by all the existing rules of international
law. Therefore, under the generally accepted principles of international law, the critical attitude of the new states of Asia and Africa
toward a certain rule is not sufficient either to change the rule or to
exempt them from its application. However, the fact that these states
constitute a majority of states today, and a considerably large majority
when put together with similarly dissatisfied Latin American states,
has consequences even within the framework of the doctrine stated
above. These consequences are twofold. First, although the critical
attitude of these states is not sufficient to change an existing rule, it does
indicate what their state practice can be expected to be. If a large majority of states follows a divergent practice concordantly, with a view
to establishing it as a rule of law, this may at least tend to create a
countervailing practice which might eventually establish a new rule
by some system of law which has not yet been developed to deal adequately with
contracts of this type. Thus, neither classic international law nor national laws are

adequate for the need.
25. This development has been taking place through, for example, international development agreements of various types, treaties between states providing capital and
skill and states receiving them, and organization and structuring of international financial
organizations.
26. SINHA, supra note 20, at Ch. II.
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to supersede the traditional one. Second, although under the doctrine
stated above the attitude of the new states may not determine the existence of a rule of international law, it becomes significant in determining whether a general consensus still exists upon the traditional norm.
If a rule of international law does not have the support of a large sector
of the international community, it would, at least, lack that foundation
which is necessary for its successful functioning.28 The principle, however, remains that an attitude of disapproval is not sufficient by itself
to change a customary norm.
MEANS FOR THE DESIRED ADJUSTMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW

What, then, are the means available to the new Asian and African
states for achieving the desired deletion or addition of rules of international law? Since these states have accepted the system of international law, if not all of its rules, the means for the desired adjustment
of the corpus of international law must be sought, even from the viewpoint of these states, within the framework of this system. These
means correspond to the sources of international law. Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice seems to be an adequate
enumeration of these sources, although there is some doubt whether the
statement contained in subparagraph 1(b) of the article corresponds
to the prevailing practice and views.2 9 According to this article the
Court,
whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states;

b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provision of Article 59 [The decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and
in respect of that particular case.], judicial decisions and the
27. Q. Wright, Custom as a Basis for International Law in the Post-War Period, 2
TExAs INT'L L. F. 147, 148-149 (1966); Q. Wright, Custom as a Basis for International

Law in the Post-War World, 7

INDIAN

J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1967).

28. R. Pal, Future Role of the InternationalLaw Conmission in the Changing World,
9 UNITED NATIONs REvmw 29, 31 (1962).
29. See, e.g., K. WorxK:,

CUsrOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, 166 (1964).
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teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.30
Judicial decisions and juristic opinions do not create rules of international law. They help ascertain these rules only as subsidiary means.
The binding force of decisions of an international court is limited only
to the parties to the dispute and in respect to the particular case. The
teachings and opinions of publicists have no binding force at all. -he
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations make it possible to develop and elaborate international law either by analogy to
principles common to the important systems of municipal law or by
deduction from accepted principles of justice. But these cannot establish new rules in derogation of the existing ones. Therefore, they cannot be relied upon for the adjustment of the content of international
law as desired by the new states, except perhaps in developing new
rules for those matters for which no rules exist at all.
This leaves international custom and treaty. Generally, custom is regarded as a slow process. Therefore, it is not considered completely
satisfactory for achieving the desired adjustment of law, although exceptionally its pace can be faster in comparatively non-controversial
matters, as for example, in establishing the rules for continental shelf.
Conclusion of treaties is a much faster process than establishment of
custom. However, treaty does not bind states not parties to it. The
objective of the desired. adjustment of law may still be achieved to a
large, if not full, extent through general and multilateral treaties.3 But
the process of negotiating them and achieving their universal, or even
general, ratification is slow, too. Therefore, although the technique of
general multilateral convention may appear at the first blush a more
efficient and speedy device than international custom, it is doubtful
whether it is more efficacious than the process of establishing custom
for achieving a change in general rules of international law on a universal basis, especially if it involves controversial matters.3 2 It is not
30. Statute of the International Court of Justice, T.S. 993.
31. Judge Hudson called this "international legislation." M.D. HU2DSON, INTERNATIONAL
LEGISLAION, Vol. I, xiii-xiv (1931).
32. Lord McNair states this difficulty when he concludes, after a study of the
Furopean Convention of 1950 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, that "in the sphere of international relations it is often easier to proceed
upon a regional than on a universal basis." MCNAIR, THE EXPANSION OF INTEMNATnONXAL
LAW, 28 (1962).
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the intention here to understate the very important role which general and multilateral treaties or conventions play in the development
of international law, and no argument is made here to discourage the
use of this device in the progressive development of international law.
But the expectations from this device must not be exaggerated for either
deleting an old rule or introducing a new one in the body of general
international law. General multilateral treaties and a regularly repetitive
pattern of bilateral treaties on a particular matter may give rise to
general norms, which, given sufficient concordance of practice, may
acquire authority of a general rule of international law, the requisite
attitude of regarding the practice as obligatory being implicit in the fact
of convention or treaty. The new rule would emerge in this manner not
as a direct consequence of treaties and conventions, but because an international custom has been created by the practice of states.
Thus, under the existing theory of international law, the formative
process of this law, as distinguished from that of the law of world
society mentioned earlier, is dominated by custom. The means available to the new states for achieving the desired adjustment in its rules
of general or universal application must be sought in its custom-making
process." The adjustment of particular application may be achieved
by means of treaty among states which are willing to conclude it. But
the treaty would bind only those states which are party to it, or, in other
words, the willing states, and not others. The adjustment of general
application is a function of the custom-making process of international
law.
THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING NEw CUSTOM

Thus, from the viewpoint of the new Asian and African states, the
next question is: What procedures are available to establish a new rule
33. When the new states of Asia and Africa effect the change on their own, without
waiting for it to be incorporated in the corpus of international law in accordance with
the existing theory of international law, they justify their action by arguing that the
traditional rule disputed by them is not a neutral rule of law which could possibly
resolve a conflict between a western and a non-western state, but, rather, it is a statement of western interests and how best they have been achieved in the past. According
to them, it may represent a policy for promotion of western interests, but it really is
not a rule of law applicable to the present structure of the society of states. If this socalled rule is a statement of western interests and of their superior position to the interests of the emerging nations, the new states of Asia and Africa are not disposed to
accepting it as creating legal obligations upon them, because this is precisely what
they had rebelled against under the rubric of independence from colonialism. SinHA,
supra note 20, at 143-144.

798
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of customary international law, whether superseding an old rule or
adding to the existing one. In other words, what is the process of custom

making in international law?34
The process of formation of international custom is not spelled in
law. Its source is the way of life of the international community, whose
product it is.", The process of its formation is a continuous phenomenon, international relations themselves being a continuous process.3 6
The precise moment when a customary norm begins to have binding

effect is intangible and cannot be ascertained.3T Nor is it necessary for
the legal solution of a problem to know that precise moment. It is sufficient to know whether the alleged rule existed at the moment claimed.
Certain writers have attempted an explanation of the mechanism of
the formation of international custom either in terms of the customcreation process of the municipal law, or by analogy to it. For example,
38
the mechanism is viewed as repetition of actions in similar situations,
or acts receiving assent of the international society and achieving obligatory character by being recognized as such,39 or general acceptance
34. This is different from the problem of establishing the elements of an international
custom, which have generally been accepted to be (a) a general practice, and (b) its
acceptance as law.
35. L. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 139 (1957).
36. Y. GouEr, LA COUTUME EN DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL INTERNE Er EN DROrr CONsTrIrIONAL INTERNATIONAL, 57 (1932); G. GIANNI, LA COUTuME EN DROIT INTERNA-

TIONAL, 168 (1931).

37. P. Guggenheim, Les deux jlkneits de la coutume en droit international, in LA
TECHNIQUE ET LES PRINcIPEs DU DROIT PUBLIC. ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE GEOROES ScELLE,

Vol. I, 275, 281 (1950); J. Basdevanr, R~gles g6ndrales du droit de la Paix, Acadimie
de droit international de la Haye, 58 RECUEIL DES Couns 471, 534-535 (1936); S. HUBERT,
PRA-vo NAuoD6w, Cz. I: EWOLUCJA, Cz. I: ZASADY OG6LNE [The Law of Nations,
Vol. I: Evolution, Vol. II: General Principles], Vol. II, 4-5 (1949): M. SORENSEN, LES
SoURCEs DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 111 (1946); K. WoLFKE, supra Note 29, at 61.
38. Fauchille explains:
Comment s'6tablit la coutume? Comme se sont 6tablie toutes les coutumes: par la rip6tition d'actes semblables. Une relation internationale s'6rant
produit, les Etats int6ress6s 'on trait6e d'une certain falon. La m~me relation s'6tant reproduite a plusiers reprises, entre les m~mes ou entre d'autres
Etats, le m~me traitement lui a 6ti appllqu6-Cette r6p6tition d'actes semblables ddmontre que la conduite suivie rtpond aux exigences de la situation.
Pourquoi ne serait-elle pas aussi la conduite de ravenir pour les hypothises
futures?
P. FAUCHILLE, TRAITi DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, Vol. I, 42 (8th ed., 1922).
39. J. Basdevant, R~gles gjndrales du droit de la paix, Acad6mie de droit international de la Haye, 58 RECUEIL DES CouRs, 475, 534-535 (1936). He explains that custom
nait des besoins de la socit internationale, s'ext6riorise par des faits qui,
recevant 'assentiment, lui donnent le caractre positif par le proc~d6 de la
reconnaissance. La r~gle, plus ou moins postul~e par les exigences de la vie
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of a judicial order,40 or generalized repetition of similar acts by competent agents of states, 4 ' or any other similar pattern.' Certain other
writers have attempted the explanation in terms of the international
life itself. For example, rules of international law are viewed as expectations of pattern of behavior and uniformity of practice resulting from
the reciprocal tolerances of the decision-makers in international relations." The theory that customary rules of international law represent
internationale, s'affirme dans un cas concrete par ce qui n'est, en sol, que
l'opinion d'un ou de plusiers gouvernements ou celle d'un juge international. Id.
40. According to de Visscher,
Dans les rapports internationaux, une coutume se forme quand une pratique, par ses applications concordants, parait suffisamment irnplant&e pour
que l'on puisse y voir l'expression d'un 6quilibre et d'une stablisation au moins
provisoire des inter8ts en pr6sence, par consequent comme l'16lment d'un
ordre juridiquement accept6 par la g~nralit des Etats. Elle tend A disparaltre quand, avec l'apparition de besoins ou d'int~r~ts nouveaux, se
dessine, g6nralement incertaine a ses origines, plus ferme par la suite, une
pratique diffirente ou contraire: le droit n'accorde sa consecration A cette
orientation nouvelle qu'autant qu'il y d~couvre les bases g~nralement
acceptables d'un ordre nouveau. C. de Visscher, Coutume et trait6 en droit
international public?
59 Rivua. GiNDRAL E DROIT INT-RNATioNAL PuBmUc 353, 356-357 (1955).
41. M. SmERT, TRAIT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc-LE DROIT DE LA PAIX, Vol. I, 32

(1951).

La coutume nait de la rptition gn~ralis~e d'actes semblables par des
agents comptents d'fttats qui, se trouvant dans une situation de fait identiques, consid~rent ces actes comme juridiquentent necessairespour la maintien et le d6veloppement des rapports internationaux.
Id.

42. See, e.g., T. GIHL, THE -LEGAL CHARACTER AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
(Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Studia juridica Stockholmiensia, No. 1), 77 (1957).
43. According to McDougal, "it is not of course the unilateral claims but rather the
reciprocal tolerances of the external decision-makers which create the expectations of
pattern and uniformity in decision, of practice in accord with rule, commonly regarded
as law." M.S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and International Law of the
Sea, 49 Aa. J. INT'L L. 356, 358, n. 7 (1955). He explains that
[firom the perspective of realistic description, the international law of the
sea . . . is . . . a process of continuous demand and response, in which
the decision-makers of particular nation states unilaterally put forward claims
of the most diverse and conflicting character to the use of the world's
seas, and in which other decision-makers, external to the demanding state
and including both national and international officials, weigh and appraise
these competing claims in terms of the interests of the world community
and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them. As such a
process, it is living, growing law, grounded in the practices and sanctioning
expectations of nation-state officials, and changing as their demands and
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toleration of expression of claims by other states has been applied by
certain writers with respect to certain particular areas of this law, such

as the law of the sea, 44 or of outer space.45 Others find it valid for
customary international law as a whole.46 It is beyond the scope of this
expectations are changed by the exigencies of new interests and technology
and by other continually evolving conditions in the world arena.
Id. at 356-357. Similarly, G. Tunkin, writes that
proces stanovlenia obycnoi normy mezdunarodnogo prava, tak ze kak i
dogovornoi normy, iest proces borby i sostrudnicestva gosudarstv. Formirovane obycnogo pravila proischodit w resultate obscenia gosudarstv, gde
kazdoe gosudarstvo stremitsa k tomu, ctoby zakrepit w kacestve normy
povedenia take pravila, kotorye sootvetstvovali by iego interesami.
G. TuNImN, VoPRosY TEORInI MEZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA, 85 (1962).
44. For example, Bierzanek writes that the idea that the right of using tile high sea
cannot be unlimited and that it must be of necessity, as a consequence of the utilization
by other states, be subject to limitations is correct. R. BiEaZANEK, MoazE OTWARTE w
SwIETLE PRAwvA MIEDZYNARODOWEGO [The High Sea in the Light of International Law],
306 (1960).
45. For example, Machowski (Counselor, Polish Mission to the United Nations),
maintains that
whether state sovereignty extends into outer space, has already been tacitly
answered negatively by practice and lack of protests on the part of any
states in connection with the orbiting of space objects over their respective
territories.
J. Machowski, Selected Problems of National Sovereignty with Reference to the Law
of Outer Space, 55 PaocEDINGs OF THE AMERICAN SocIETY OF INTERNALTIONAL LAW 169,
171 (1961).
Similarly, Johnson (General Counsel, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
[of the United States]) states that
[diuring the past three and one-half years, numerous satellites launched
by both the United States and the Soviet Union have repeatedly passed
over the territory of every nation on earth. No permission was sought in
advance, none was expressly given by any state, and not a single protest
has been registered by any other states.
From this he concludes that
no state has the right to exclude other states from the use of any part of
"outer space" above this altitude [about 100 miles]. The alternative theory
is that, so long as the upward limit of territorial sovereignty is not defined
by explicit agreement, the practice of the past three and a half years serves
only to establish a right of passage for spacecraft of a scientific, exploratory, and non-military nature; but that the claim of territorial sovereignty
might legally still be invoked to exclude other types of spacecraft serving
other purposes.

J. Johnson, Remarks, 55

PRoCEmDNs

OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,

165, 167 (1961).
46. For example, MacGibbon suggests that
[t]his description of the forces at work in the formation of the law in a
particular sphere is-for the most part-valid in relation to customary international law as a whole; and it may usefully be elaborated in order to
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article to describe the sociological process of the mechanism and how
it gives birth to international custom. However, from the viewpoint of
the new states it is necessary to observe how the mechanism is put into
motion so as to achieve the objective stated above.
From this perspective, a functional view may be taken of this mechanism. There are two aspects of this function. First, the initiation of a
possible norm. Second, the promotion of its general acceptance as a
norm.47 The proposed rule must be suggested to the members of the
society of states, and efforts must be made to achieve its adoption by
them as an imperative mode of inter-state behavior. The performance
of these two aspects of the function does not admit of a sharp distinction. The same device or instrumentality often performs both. It may
initiate a possible norm as well as help promote its acceptance by states.
The initiation of a proposition may take place through, for example,
writings of individual jurists, 48 decisions of courts and tribunals, 49 inclarify the function of acquiescence in the development of international
custom.
I.C. MacGibbon, Custcnary InternationalLaw and Acquiescence, 33 THE BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTENATioNAL LAW 115,116 (1957).
According to Wolfke,
[t]he most essential element of that mechanism [of the formation of international custom] consists in conduct being expression of certain claims, and
the toleration of such conduct (hence claims) by other States. One might
say that the general balance of the practice of States, and attitude to such
practice, in a certain section of international life-such attitudes accruing
or cancelling each other-comprises the current binding customary law in
that section. K. WoLr'K, supra Note 29, at 65.
For the perception of international custom as the sum total of facts of conduct of
states, see also P.I. LuKin, ISTOCHIKI ME;ZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA, 77 (1960).
47. VRIGHT, supra Note 27, at 157, presents a somewhat similar view of the process
when he states that to
establish new norms of customary law requires (1) procedures for formulating and publicizing norms likely to be generally acceptable to states and
adequate to meet a new situation, and (2) procedures for facilitating the
observance, recognition or acquiescence in such norms by all states.
48. The extent to which the classical writers formulated rules of international law
in its early development was considerable. However, even today, the influence of the
opinion of jurists and publicists cannot be disregarded. C. RousSEAu, PRINcIPEs
GgaNiAUX Du DRoiT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc, 818 (1949); M. Sorensen, suipra Note 37,
at 189,190; G.I. TumiN, supra Note 43, at 142-143.
49. L. Kopelmanas, C2ustom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, 18 THE
BRTSH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 127, 143 (1937); G. SCHWARZENBERGAR, INTERNATIONAL LAWV, Vol. 1, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS,

62, 63-66 (3rd ed., 1957); S.B. Krilov, Les notions principales du droit des

gens, Acadmie de droit international de la Haye, 70

RECUEIL DEs CouRs

411, 443 (1947).
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international agreements or treaties, whether bi-

lateral or multilateral, 5 ' executive declarations, 52 legislative enactments,51

and practice of international organizations. 54 In addition to initiating
possible norms many of these instrumentalities may also promote their
general acceptance by states. It is for the policy-makers of the new
states to use these devices and instrumentalities, available within the

framework of the existing international system, to achieve the desired
adjustment of customary international law. That this is realized by
50. As has been said, G.A. Finch, Les sources modernes du droit international,AcaRECUEIL DES COURS 535, 585 (1935).
Un autre facteur qui a contribu6 au d6veloppement du droit international,
et qui doit 6tre 6tudii par rapport a la coutume, est la courtoisie interna-

d6mie de droit international de la Haye, 53
tionale

(Comity of Nations). .

.

. Le droit international d'aujourd'hui

doit beaucoup a Ia courtoisie international, dont ses r~gles souvent drivent.
See also G. DAHM, VOLKERRECHT, Vol. I, 33 (1958); J. Kosters, Les fondements du
droit des gens, 4 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 115,. 228 (1925); T. GunL, TIM LEGAL CHARACTER AND SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis, Studia
juridica Stockholmiensia, No. 1) 80-82 (1957); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, (ed.
by H. Lauterpacht), Vol. 1, 25 (7th ed., 1948).
51. As Waldock says, treaties "not infrequently served as an instrument for the
creation of customary law when, in dealing with a particular matter, different pairs of
States adopted the same treaty provisions in a regular succession of bilateral treaties."
H. WA.oCK, supra note 18, at 40. See also J. KosTERs, supra note 50, at 221; A. DFRYNG,
GL6wNE TENDENCIE Rozowoju PRAWA NARD6w w SwIETLE ORECZ.NICWA STALEOO
TRYBUNALU
SPRAWIEDLIWVOSCI
MIEDZYNARODOWEJ
[The Principal Trends of
Development of the Law of Nations in the Light of Decisions of the Perma-

nent Court of International Justice], 39 (1932); N.

MATEESco, LA COUTUME DANS LES

250-254 (1947); SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 563; P.I. LUKIN, ISTOCNIKI MEZDUNARODNOGO PRAVA, 87 (1960); P. GUGGENHEIM,
TRATrr DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, AVEC MENTION DE IA PRATIQUE INTERNATIONAL
EN SUISSE, Vol. 1, 51-52 (1953).
52. Q. WRIGHT, supra note 47, at 157-161; L. GOULD, AN INTRODUCrION TO INTERN ACYCLES

JURIDIQUES INTERNATIONAuX,

TIONAL LAW,

53.

610 (1957).

TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONA.L PUBLIC, Vol. 1, 50-51; L. KoPELsupra, note 49, at 147-148; Sorensen, Les sources, 91; Rousseau, Principes
giniraux, 850-853; G.A. Finch "Les sources modernes," supra note 50, at 583; Mateesco,
La coutwne, 220; L. Siorot, Les lacunes en droit international (Etudes de la fonction
judiciare), 345-364 (1958); Q. Wright, "Custom," supra note 47, at 157-161; S.B. Krilov,
supra note 49, at 444; Lukin, lstocnik, supra note 46, at 131; Tunkin, Voprosy, supra
note 43, at 142-144. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, (1927).
54. C.W. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND, 175 (1958); Q. WRIGHT, supra note
47, at 157-161; L. KOPELMANAS, supra note 50, at 132-138; M. Sorensen, Prhcipes de
droit international, Acad6mie de droit international de ]a Haye, 101 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 37-38 (1960); M. LACHS, Wspdlczensne organizacie miedzynarodowue i roz-x6j prawa
imiedzynarodocwego, 12 PARisrow I PRAWO 827-836 (1963); K. Skubiszewski, Kompetencie prawodawcze 'wsplnot ettropejskicb, 1962 PRZEGLAD ZACHODKI 10, 229; S.
HUBERT, Prawo narod6w, Vol. II, 3-4 (1949); TUNKIN, supra note 43, at 123-134.
GUGGENHEIM,
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these states is evident from their activity in this direction in, for example, the proceedings of the International Court of Justice, the International Law Commission, the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly, the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee, the special conferences dealing with issues of international law
convened by the United Nations and other international organizations,
the decisions of their national courts in cases bearing upon the issues
of international law, and the relevant proclamations, notifications, and
declarations of their governments. From these sources expectations as
to the practice of these states may reasonably be constructed. 5
CONCLUSION

So far as the existing body of international law, as distinguished from
the emerging law of world society, is concerned, the new states of Asia
and Africa desire a certain adjustment of it so as to reflect and promote
their own interests as well as those of western states, and not merely the
latter. This has brought certain existing rules in dispute. Since the new
states have accepted the system of international law, the means available
to them for the desired adjustment must be sought within the framework of this system. Custom is of natal significance to this system. The
creation of a new rule of general application, limited neither to a small
number of willing states nor to a particular transaction, either superseding an existing rule or adding to the existing ones, is a function of
international custom. Treaty may bring about a particular adjustment
concerning a certain transaction among willing states. But if the objective is an adjustment of international law itself, resort must be had
to international custom. From a functional point of view, custom
creation involves the initiation of the desired norm in the society of
states and obtaining its adoption by them as an imperative mode of interstate behavior. A number of devices are available for achieving the
performance of these functions. It is for the new states to use them.
Evidence suggests that they have made some such use.56

55. This has been attempted in SINnA, supra note 20.
56. This evidence may be found in Id. at Part IL Chs. IV-XI.

